Autocratic Legalism
Kim Lane Scheppele†
Buried within the general phenomenon of democratic decline is a set of cases
in which charismatic new leaders are elected by democratic publics and then use
their electoral mandates to dismantle by law the constitutional systems they inherited. These leaders aim to consolidate power and to remain in office indefinitely,
eventually eliminating the ability of democratic publics to exercise their basic democratic rights, to hold leaders accountable, and to change their leaders peacefully.
Because these “legalistic autocrats” deploy the law to achieve their aims, impending
autocracy may not be evident at the start. But we can learn to spot the legalistic
autocrats before autocratic constitutionalism becomes fatal because they are often
following a script using tactics that they borrow from each other. This Essay explains the paths that these autocratic legalists take, the danger signals that accompany their legal reforms, and the methods they use to dismantle liberal constitutions.
The Essay also suggests how the legalistic autocrats may be stopped.

INTRODUCTION
By now, we know the pattern: A constitutional democracy,
flawed but in reasonably good standing, is hit by a transformative
election. A charismatic new leader comes to power, propelled by
the growing impatience that the electorate feels with things as
they are. The leader promises to sweep away the dysfunctions of
partisanship, gridlock, bureaucracy. He claims to call things by
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their right names and to speak the unspeakable. He rails against
entrenched power, entrenched people, entrenched structure. He
rallies the people by assuring them that the state belongs to them,
only them. He wins an upset victory over the establishment forces
and starts a constitutional revolution.
Around the world, liberal constitutionalism is taking a hit
from charismatic leaders like these whose signature promise is to
not play by the old rules. But such hits have been long foretold.
In one constitutional democracy after another, publics have
grown increasingly discontent with their political institutions.1
This decline in public trust is particularly pronounced in countries that were hit hard by the global financial crisis of 2008 and
after.2 But while the Great Recession made matters worse, democratic decline was already underway because the number of
countries that could call themselves democracies in good standing began to drop before the economic crisis hit.3 Democratic malaise has economic correlates, but the causes go beyond economics.4 Something even bigger must be going wrong with democracy
across many countries at once.
The reasons for, and even the existence of, democratic decline
are contested. Some claim that scholars overcounted democracies
in the first place, so the drop in the number of democracies we are
observing worldwide is just the reversion to type of countries that

1
Taking the average of OECD countries, trust in public institutions declined from
approximately 44 percent in 2009 to approximately 36 percent in 2013. See Esteban OrtizOspina and Max Roser, Trust (Our World in Data, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/W5ET
-R536. But that is an average; particular countries record even more devastating declines.
For example, in recent years, only about 10 percent of Americans have a “great deal/quite a
lot” of trust in Congress, down from around 40 percent in the 1970s. Confidence in Institutions (Gallup, 2017), online at http://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx
(visited Oct 29, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
2
Recent data from within the European Union shows a precipitous decline in trust
in both EU institutions and national institutions since the global financial crisis and the
Eurozone debt crisis. Trust in government in EU debtor countries declined from between 40
to 50 percent before the crisis to less than 20 percent in 2015. See Chase Foster and Jeffry
Frieden, Crisis of Trust: Socio-economic Determinants of Europeans’ Confidence in Government *12 (Harvard Working Paper, Feb 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/43CK-BKJD.
3
Every Freedom House democracy indicator has declined since 2006, and 105 countries suffered net declines in democracy indicators during the decade from 2006 to 2016. See
Arch Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians *3–5 (Freedom House, June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/DCK4-VVLL.
4
See Marc F. Plattner, Is Democracy in Decline?, 13 Democracy & Society 1, 4 (Fall–
Winter 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X29H-2NNR (pointing to the causal role of “bad
governance,” which “refers in the first instance to the failure of many new democracies to
build well-functioning and effective states, which often leads to lagging economic growth,
poor public services, lack of personal security, and pervasive corruption”).
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were never really democratic in the first place.5 Others claim that
even long-standing democracies have been falling apart in the
last decade or so at a higher rate than ever before and that we are
therefore witnessing a major democratic recession, in which even
the democracies that have not failed are getting worse.6 On balance, I think that the “democratic decline” camp has the better
case. What is particularly disturbing about this phenomenon,
however, is not the sheer number of democracies that have proven
vulnerable, but instead the way that a number of these failing
democracies have retreated from their earlier standards. As I argue in this Essay, democracies are not just failing for cultural or
economic or political reasons. Some constitutional democracies
are being deliberately hijacked by a set of legally clever autocrats,
who use constitutionalism and democracy to destroy both.
Buried in the story of decline, then, is a story of constitutional
malice. New autocrats are not just benefiting from the crisis of
confidence in public institutions; they are attacking the basic
principles of liberal and democratic constitutionalism because
they want to consolidate power and entrench themselves in office
for the long haul. To outside observers who simply note that elections continue to occur and nothing illegal is going on in these
places, it may seem that these democracies are in good (or good
enough) health. But the autocrats who hijack constitutions seek
to benefit from the superficial appearance of both democracy and
legality within their states. They use their democratic mandates
to launch legal reforms that remove the checks on executive
power, limit the challenges to their rule, and undermine the crucial accountability institutions of a democratic state. Because
these autocrats push their illiberal measures with electoral backing and use constitutional or legal methods to accomplish their

5
See, for example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, The Myth of Democratic Recession, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds, Democracy in Decline? 58, 59 (Johns
Hopkins 2015).
6
Professor Larry Diamond counts twenty-five specific cases of democratic breakdown in which he believes that misclassification is not the story. See Larry Diamond, Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, in Diamond and Plattner, eds, Democracy in Decline?
98, 102–04 (cited in note 5). See also Puddington, Breaking Down Democracy at 3, 5 (cited
in note 3) (showing that there has been an across-the-board decline in the indicators that
Freedom House uses to measure democratic health of nations and calling the period from
2006 to 2016 the “decade of decline”). Professors Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq distinguish
sudden collapses of democratic governments, which they call reversions, from gradual erosion of constitutionalism, which they call retrogressions, and they document a growing
number of the second in recent years. See Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a
Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L Rev *13–16 (forthcoming 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/G48G-6ZDB.
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aims, they can hide their autocratic designs in the pluralism of
legitimate legal forms.
Constitutional democracy is indeed a pluralistic category.
There is a wide but normatively justifiable variation in the institutional forms and substantive rules that one can find among
constitutional-democratic states. Within those legitimate variations, some combinations of these forms and rules prove toxic to
the continued maintenance of the liberal forms of constitutional
democracy. And the new autocrats are finding those combinations. While democracy, constitutionalism, and liberalism once
marched arm in arm through history, we now see liberalism being
pushed out of the parade by a new generation of autocrats who
know how to game the system. Intolerant majoritarianism and
plebiscitary acclimation of charismatic leaders are now masquerading as democracy, led by new autocrats who first came to power
through elections and then translated their victories into illiberal
constitutionalism. When electoral mandates plus constitutional
and legal change are used in the service of an illiberal agenda, I
call this phenomenon autocratic legalism.7
This Essay focuses on the particular cases of autocratic legalism within the general phenomenon of democratic decline. By attacking the very basis of a constitutional order while using the
methods made possible by that constitutional order, the new illiberals may be cheered on at first by the adulating crowds who
sought change, but those same crowds will find these illiberals
impossible to remove once they have destroyed the constitutional
system that could have maintained their democratic accountability over the long run.
To get a better sense for how the legalistic autocrats function,
Part I turns to the question of how one can recognize them early
on. Next, Part II shows how the weaknesses and complexities in
the theory of liberal democratic constitutionalism itself can be
used to undermine liberalism. Then, Part III traces the typical

7
Professor Javier Corrales first used this phrase to describe Hugo Chávez’s rule in
Venezuela. Corrales identified autocratic legalism with the “use, abuse and non-use . . . of
law” to describe what Chávez did to consolidate political power and sideline competitors.
Chávez used the law by pushing the parliament to pass new laws giving him new powers,
abused the law by deliberately changing the interpretation of law on the books to suit his
goals, and non-used the law by failing to enforce law that stood in his way. See Javier
Corrales, Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela, 26 J Democracy 37, 38–45 (Apr 2015). My use
of the phrase “autocratic legalism” is compatible with Corrales’s formulation, because it
also highlights the extraordinary attention that the new autocrats pay to law as a tool of
power consolidation, but I differ from him in emphasizing the deliberate creation of new
law as a way of consolidating political power.
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script of the autocratic legalists to show precisely how they consolidate power under cover of law. The Essay concludes by asking
what it would take to stop legalistic autocracy before it does irreparable harm to a liberal and constitutional democracy.
I. METHODS AND MADNESS
How does one recognize an autocratic legalist in action? One
should first suspect a democratically elected leader of autocratic
legalism when he8 launches a concerted and sustained attack on
institutions whose job it is to check his actions or on rules that
hold him to account, even when he does so in the name of his democratic mandate. Loosening the bonds of constitutional constraint
on executive power through legal reform is the first sign of the
autocratic legalist.
Hungary since 2010 has been my archetypal case. That year,
the popularly elected government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
won 68 percent of the seats in Parliament with 53 percent of the
popular vote.9 Because the constitution permitted amendment
with a single two-thirds vote of the unicameral parliament,
Fidesz’s constitutional majority allowed it to rewrite the 1989–
1990 constitution and thousands of pages of new laws in Orbán’s
first term.10 Before benefiting from the election laws that his government drew up to guarantee that he would win another term in
2014,11 Orbán’s early legal initiatives attacked the independence
8
I use “he” here not to ignore gender but precisely to highlight that the classic cases
so far have involved male leaders. Therefore, using “she” as a generic would be misleading.
9
See Kim Lane Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution, in
Armin von Bogdandy and Pál Sonnevend, eds, Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area 111, 111–12 (Oxford 2015).
10 Id at 111–13. I call the 2010–2014 term Orbán’s first term in office even though
he had already been prime minister once before from 1998–2002. Though his autocratic
tendencies were visible even then, the government of 1998–2002 was a coalition government in which Orbán’s party, Fidesz, was the lead party. But because the other centerright parties with whom Orbán was in coalition failed to support Orbán’s more radical
initiatives, this earlier government was not operating purely on Orbán’s script. After 2010,
the Fidesz party, operating in close coordination with the Christian Democracy Party, held
68 percent of the seats in the parliament, giving Orbán a constitutional majority for his
initiatives.
11 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary: An Election in Question, Part 1: The Political
Landscape (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NB4R-UMWQ (laying
out the distribution of political forces that were the object of gaming in the election rules);
Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2: Writing the Rules to Win—
the Basic Structure (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/95M5-6573
(showing how a combination of gerrymandering and new rules awarding parliamentary
seats tilted the election in the governing party’s favor); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, an
Election in Question, Part 3: Compensating the Winners (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/U39T-9VMP (showing how the majority party turned its margin
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of crucial institutions, such as the judiciary, the media, the prosecutor’s office, the tax authority, and the election commission.12
One of his first targets was the constitutional court, which nonetheless took three years to capture. Soon all other independent
institutions were filled with party loyalists, including the ordinary judiciary, so that they were no longer independent of the
governing party.13 Orbán removed opposition figures and neutral
experts from public institutions, expanded the length of their successors’ terms of office so that they would carry his influence beyond the usual term of a democratic government, and wrongfooted the opposition by changing parliamentary procedure so
that opposition MPs could not even speak on the floor, let alone
offer any amendments to government bills.14 With a constitutional
supermajority that meant he could change any law in the system
at will, including the constitution, Orbán carried out an autocratic revolution with exquisite legal precision.15
If this had happened only in Hungary, it might be dismissed
as a freak occurrence. But Hungary was not alone. Orbán liberally borrowed some of his own illiberal tactics from autocratic legalists who had gone before him, and he has passed some of his

of victory into a supermajority result and interfered with the independence of the Election
Commission); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 4: The New
Electorate (in Which Some Are More Equal than Others) (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/69HC-4XJ5 (showing how nearly half a million voters were disenfranchised and a different half million new voters were added to the voter rolls, while a
clever system to divert minority votes to ethnic lists was designed to ensure that ethnic
minorities would never gain any parliamentary seats); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An
Election in Question, Part 5: The Unequal Campaign (NY Times, Feb 28, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/63D5-9MST (showing how the campaign rules and the election authorities themselves benefited the governing party). The election monitors agreed with most
of these criticisms of the election system, concluding that “[t]he main governing party enjoyed an undue advantage because of restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation between political party and the
State.” See generally Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Hungary, Parliamentary Elections, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report
(Apr 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/54RZ-7Y6P.
12 See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal
Turn: Disabling the Constitution, 23 J Democracy 138, 139–44 (July 2012); Miklós
Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to Government without Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions, in Gábor Attila Tóth, ed,
Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law 237, 238–39
(CEU 2012).
13 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 115–19
(cited in note 9).
14 See Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to Government
without Checks at 239 (cited in note 12).
15 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 113 (cited
in note 9).
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own techniques on to others. Even before Hungary’s fall from
democratic grace, President Vladimir Putin in Russia had consolidated his power through law by, among other things, canceling
elections of local governors and appointing his own handpicked
candidates instead.16 Orbán copied Putin by first centralizing
many local government functions in his new constitution and
then handpicking all of the local government leaders to make
them personally loyal to him.17 Both Orbán and Putin established
a “vertical of power”18 (as the Russians call it) to give the national
leader a direct line into the local governments to exercise detailed control of their actions without going through the national
parliament.
Orbán also borrowed from the prime minister (now president)
of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who, among other things, managed to flummox critics by packing the Constitutional Court of
Turkey with judges of his own choosing while simultaneously expanding their jurisdiction to handle many more cases, something
that could be viewed as either a boost to or the destruction of the
institution.19 Orbán did the same thing one year later, as he expanded the number of judges on the Constitutional Court of
Hungary to give his party control over the court, but, at the same
time, gave the court jurisdiction over constitutional complaints,
individual petitions from those who claim that their individual
rights are violated. This move was anticipated to flood the court
with many politically insignificant cases, which would require

16 See Kim Lane Scheppele, “We Forgot about the Ditches”: Russian Constitutional
Impatience and the Challenge of Terrorism, 53 Drake L Rev 963, 1013–15 (2005).
17 See Bálint Magyar, Autocracy in Action—Hungary under Orbán (Heinrich Böll
Stiftung, May 18, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/P7QM-4NUT:

Finally, during the latest municipal elections in the autumn of 2010, Orbán replaced those old local Fidesz cadres [who] still enjoyed some independence with
his vassals. It was no longer enough to be a loyal party member; in Fidesz, one
had to be devoted to the party leader. Fidesz members know what happens when
one questions Orbán’s decisions or openly rebels against them. A slip of the
tongue can end a party career. Those who are insubordinate are expelled, forever; there is no repose. Fidesz members were the first Hungarians to learn that
“these guys mean business.”
18

Scheppele, 53 Drake L Rev at 1013 (cited in note 16).
See Steven A. Cook, How Erdogan Made Turkey Authoritarian Again (The Atlantic,
July 21, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/MVN9-HWGM (showing how Erdoğan first liberalized Turkey and prepared it to join the European Union and then backtracked with
reforms that allowed him to pack the courts with sympathetic judges; because the courtpacking reforms also included liberalizing moves at the same time, critics did not know
what to make of them).
19
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more judges in order for the court to function properly.20 So, was
the expansion of the number of judges court packing or was it a
sign that the leader intended to support the court by giving it the
resources it badly needed? By adding judges, both Orbán and
Erdoğan confused critics who could not tell if the courts were being politically compromised or judicially bolstered.21
Orbán did not just borrow from others; he also bequeathed
his own tactics to others. After Orbán’s success at foiling attempts
by European institutions to halt the slide into autocracy,22 the
new government in Poland began to travel down the same road

20 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 115–16
(cited in note 9).
21 American readers will no doubt think of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1937
court-packing plan as a parallel example. Facing repeated rejections of his New Deal
agenda by the Supreme Court, Roosevelt proposed to add a new justice for every sitting
justice over the age of seventy, a move that would have had the effect of allowing him to
replace enough judges to generate a Court majority friendly to his programs. Like Orbán
and Erdoğan, Roosevelt was well aware of how bad it would look to use court packing to
achieve a particular substantive aim unless it were coated in a persuasive rationale.
Roosevelt therefore undertook to dress up the proposed reform in a justification that had
nothing to do with changing the decisions of the Court. Roosevelt pitched his move as
necessary to maintain the vitality of an aging Court. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The
Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 S Ct Rev 347, 395.
While hiding the incapacitation of the peak court under cover of judicial reform makes
the three cases of Roosevelt, Erdoğan, and Orbán sound familiar, there are still substantial differences among them. First, Roosevelt considered a plan to amend the Constitution
to change the Court’s composition, but this plan was abandoned because the outcome was hard
to foresee, and it would have taken too much time in any event. Id at 384–86. Roosevelt then
turned to Congress to pass a law to pack the Court. Id. Roosevelt’s plan ran aground on a
resistant Congress whose upper chamber had the countermajoritarian institution of the
filibuster to bolster minority opposition. See William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s CourtPacking Plan: A Second Life, a Second Death, Duke L J 673, 681–84 (1985). Roosevelt
failed not because his plan was so different but instead because the US constitutional
order simply has more choke points that make seizing control of the courts difficult;
Roosevelt was almost guaranteed to fail. In short, the US Constitution’s defenses against
constitutional capture worked.
By contrast, both Orbán and Erdoğan, as prime ministers with guaranteed parliamentary majorities governing under constitutions with easier amendment rules, saw their
plans to pack their respective courts sail through. In Hungary, the unicameral parliament
that had a supermajority of Fidesz supporters rubber-stamped Orbán’s scheme to change
the system for electing judges. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions Can Strengthen Peak Courts at Times of Crisis, 23 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 51, 71–72 (2014). In Turkey, Erdoğan put the expanded number of judges to a one-off national referendum that amended the constitution,
a far easier process of constitutional amendment than the American one. See Can Yeginsu,
Turkey Packs the Court (NY Review of Books Daily, Sept 22, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/2VXW-5Y7X. Orbán and Erdoğan lived in different constitutional systems
from Roosevelt that made their capture of the peak court much easier.
22 For a detailed account of the way that European institutions attempted (and
failed) to halt Orbán’s seizure of the constitutional court, see Scheppele, 23 Transnatl L &
Contemp Probs at 87–116 (cited in note 21).
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using a map drawn by Orbán, starting with an attack on the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal that centered on the appointment
of judges before moving on to a full-scale assault on the ordinary
judiciary.23 Poland borrowed from Hungary the method of gaining
control over the lower courts by seizing appointment power over
the court presidents and, through changing the court leadership,
gaining control over the court system. In Hungary, this had been
done by lowering the judicial retirement age in a civil-service system in which the most senior judges had been promoted through
long careers into the leadership positions, so that forcing early
retirements opened up nearly half of the lower-court presidencies.24 Poland did it slightly differently, by proposing in a bill to
give the justice minister the power to fire the presidents of the
lower courts within six months of the passage of a new law in
summer 2017.25 Protests ultimately led the president to veto two
of the three proposed bills reforming the judiciary.26 But just as
Hungary had done before, Poland claimed that all of its judicial
reforms borrowed the laws on the judiciary from some other (unnamed) member state of the European Union.27 An even more direct borrowing of Hungary’s style of judicial takeover occurred in
Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood government of President
Mohamed Morsi did precisely the same thing as Fidesz in Hungary,

23 See generally Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of
Law Backsliding in the EU, 19 Camb Yearbook Eur Legal Stud 3 (2017).
24 In Hungary, the move to lower judicial retirement ages was declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court in its waning days of independence, but the court
did so in a way that made no difference at all. See Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade
the Constitution: The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Judicial Retirement Age, Part I (Verfassungsblog, Aug 9, 2012) (explaining the decision), archived at
http://perma.cc/3MES-6L6H; Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade the Constitution: The
Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Judicial Retirement Age, Part II (Verfassungsblog,
Aug 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3SL5-4E99 (noting that the decision made no
difference because the court failed to give the claimant “any meaningful relief,” such as
nullifying specific presidential orders through which the judges were fired).
25 See Anna Sledzinska-Simon, The Polish Revolution: 2015–2017 (ICONnect, July
25, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T2ZC-XVJK.
26 See Kinga Stanczuk, Making Politics Possible Again (Jacobin, Aug 12, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/85ZB-9EPC.
27 See Mehreen Khan, Poland Rebuffs EU Concerns over Politicisation of Its Judiciary (Fin Times, Aug 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/G36H-328C. There is something
to Poland’s point that the country was meeting European standards. In Germany, the justice minister also presides over the process for appointing judges on all the high courts
except for the constitutional court. But in Germany, there is a complex vetting process
involving extensive consultation with many actors to depoliticize the process and ensure
the quality of the judges. See Jenny Gesley, How Judges Are Selected in Germany (In
Custodia Legis: Law Librarians of Congress Blog, May 3, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/SYD4-3ZPX. These safeguards are missing in the Polish reforms.
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proposing to lower the judicial retirement age to take over the
most important positions in the judiciary.28
On the other side of the world, the new autocratically legalistic revolutions in Latin America show that this phenomenon is
not limited to right-wing or religious-nationalist leaders. Latin
America also illustrates that ideas can spread from one legalistic
autocrat to another. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela won the presidency in 1998 by mounting an insurgent campaign from outside
the two dominant political parties.29 Because his new victorious
party had little toehold in the other branches of government, he
launched a concerted attack on the constitutional system he inherited, summoning a new constituent assembly to write a constitution that suited his new rule.30 He designed the rules for election of representatives to this constituent assembly in a way that
gave his party 95 percent of the seats in the assembly with 60
percent of the popular vote.31 The new constitution that resulted
from a convention full of chavistas (as Chávez supporters were
called) gave Chávez substantial power to push through his autocratic program. Among other things, it established a strong presidency and eliminated the senate, which had been an important
constraint on executive power before that time.32
Rewriting a constitution to design a system suitable for an
ambitious new leader was an idea that spread. Winning a presidential election in 2006 on a revolutionary platform, President
Rafael Correa of Ecuador copied Chávez by convening a constituent assembly to write a new constitution more to his liking.33
Correa’s new constitution was approved in a referendum in 2008
with 64 percent public support. It mixed “hyperpresidentialism
with an expanded list of rights,”34 a mix that is a signature element of the new autocrats who confound their critics by adding to
toxic constitutional change ideas that seem like constitutional advances. Both Chávez and Correa may well have given Orbán the
idea that a new constitution would give him the opportunity to
sweep away the power of the opposition if he could control the

28 See David Risley, Former President Morsi’s Attacks on the Judiciary, and Judicial
Backlash (Egypt Justice, June 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/75FP-BF3G.
29 See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC Davis L Rev 189, 203 (2013).
30 Id at 204–06.
31 See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 Ala L Rev 923, 941–
42 (2013).
32 Corrales, 26 J Democracy at 38 (cited in note 7).
33 See Carlos de la Torre, Technocratic Populism in Ecuador, 24 J Democracy 33, 34
(July 2013).
34 Id at 36.
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process, which he then did to produce a constitution that was supported only by his own party.35
I don’t mean to overstate the degree of similarity among legalistic autocrats. Not all of these governments followed precisely
the same trajectory even though they were heading in the same
direction. For example, only some of the legalistic autocrats
started to attack the constitution itself immediately while others
waited for some time before doing so. While Chávez, Correa, and
Orbán changed their constitutions entirely as soon as they came
to power, both Erdoğan and Putin were in office for years before
it was clear that they planned to make structural changes to the
organization of their governments to put liberal constitutional democracy in danger.36
After more than a decade of autocratic consolidation, Russia
and Venezuela seem to have fallen completely out of the family of
global democracies,37 and Venezuela is showing signs of being a
failed state.38 It seems to take a bit more than a decade after these
sorts of reforms begin before the pretense of democratic and constitutional government disappears entirely and the force underlying the system becomes openly visible. But not all states that
start down this path of autocratic legalism necessarily end in a
democratic death spiral. Some states pull back from the brink.
For example, Ecuador seems to have avoided autocratic consolidation for now because Correa accepted the failure of his attempt
to extend the length of his term and then permitted an election to

35 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Unconstitutional Constituent Power *32–36 (unpublished manuscript, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3DG2-RTXX.
36 Both Russia and Turkey tried at first to appeal to Western values. Suat
Kınıklıoğlu, Turkey and Russia: Aggrieved Nativism Par Excellence (Turkey Analyst, May
10, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/ 6CVR-LUVN:

While the reasons behind their turn toward aggrieved nativism differ in Turkey
and Russia, it is nevertheless noteworthy that their regressions were preceded
by liberal and open eras. In fact, both Erdoğan and Putin tried to cooperate and
to move their countries closer to the West. While Putin sought a framework
where he could work with [NATO] and be part of an enlarged Europe, Erdoğan
aggressively pursued accession negotiations with the [European Union]. Both
leaders embarked on the path of aggrieved nativism after their attempts had
failed.
37 Freedom House now ranks Venezuela and Russia as “not free.” Both showed large
declines in freedom scores over the preceding ten years. See Freedom House, Freedom in
the World 2017 *6, 10 (2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BT7J-HUAX.
38 See William Finnegan, Venezuela, a Failing State (New Yorker, Nov 14, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/VF9M-QFZX.
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go forward that resulted in a relatively peaceful transfer of leadership, though the post of president went to Correa’s protégé.39
While Poland looks dire as I write, it is also clear that there is an
active and well-organized opposition to the Kaczyński government, along with at least some remnants of a pluralistic media
and active civil society.40 It may have a better chance of pulling
out of the tailspin than Hungary, where the media has been monopolized, civil society has been neutralized, the “democratic” opposition (that is, opposition parties not including the far-right
Jobbik party) has been completely ineffective, and more than half
a million people have left the country.41 It certainly seems that
not all autocratic legalist regimes have the same end point or
move the same speed along a preordained path.
It is important to remember that we are identifying a trend
as it is emerging, and so we are evaluating many of these regimes
in medias res, while they are still developing. While we can therefore see how these regimes start, we do not yet have a detailed
map of how these experiments end. Some regimes labeled as autocratic now may have a democratic rebirth later. Other regimes
that are declining may fall into the abyss of authoritarianism.
The phenomenon is still important, and worrying, even if it is only
temporary. While autocrats consolidate power, things are bad
enough. Moreover, liberal deconsolidation is serious enough to
warrant an attempt to understand how autocratic legalism
works.
We can spot the legalistic autocrats while they are still consolidating power because they have ambitions to monopolize
power and tend to use the same toolbox of tricks. It is the overreaching aspiration and the legalistic tools of the trade that turn
the leaders I consider here into legalistic autocrats, not their relative success or failure in the end. Legalistic autocrats may be
foiled and their illiberal reforms reversed. They may also turn
into full-blown dictators. But first one must see them for what
they are. They come to power and justify their actions through
elections and then use legal methods to remove the liberal content
from constitutionalism.
39 See Soledad Stoessel, The Left Won Ecuador’s Presidential Election: Cue RightWing Revolt (The Conversation, Apr 17, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/EZ8Z-3JAP.
40 See Stanczuk, Making Politics Possible Again (cited in note 26).
41 See generally Hungary: Democracy under Threat (International Federation for
Human Rights, Nov 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2LG4-BMTZ; Justin Spike, More
Than 600,000 Hungarians Could Be Living in Other EU Countries (Budapest Beacon,
Sept 1, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/UTP3-YLF4 (noting the “probable number of
Hungarians living in the EU was pushed slightly above 600,000”).
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II. LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY—AND
THOSE WHO SPEAK IN THEIR NAME
Legalistic autocrats operate by pitting democracy against
constitutionalism to the detriment of liberalism. This is not hard.
Democracy and constitutionalism are famously in tension when
what the people want at any given moment is (or should be) overridden by constitutional principles that thwart that desire. Democracy is a political system in which leaders are accountable to
the people; constitutionalism is a political system in which leaders and the people together are additionally accountable within a
system of constitutional constraint to uphold basic values that
transcend the moment. Democracy and constitutionalism may
come into conflict when publics fail in their constitutional obligations and elections produce a majority for unconstitutional
change. Or the tensions between constitutionalism and democracy may create a crisis when elites offer choices to democratic
publics that put liberalism on the line. Legalistic autocrats know
this and use a simplistic idea of democracy—what any particular
election happens to have produced—to rail against any constitutional constraint that stands in the way of what the people electorate said they wanted. The end result when such a ploy succeeds is simple majoritarianism, which can lead quickly to
illiberalism. Of course, the tension between democracy and constitutionalism can be also resolved in a liberal manner.
Democratic constitutionalism resolves the tension between
democracy and constitutionalism by baking into constitutionalism the requirement of a self-sustaining democracy, a system in
which the people can continue over time choosing their leaders,
holding them to account, and rotating power when leaders disappoint.42 The temporary frustration of a democratic majority in the
name of a longer-term commitment to ensuring that democratic
majorities can continue to choose their leaders into the future can
be justified by taking the dignity and liberty of individuals—
including minorities now, as well as future persons later—as
central obligations of constitutional governance.43 Short-term
democratic frustration can be justified in the name of providing
longer-term democratic guarantees.

42 For a similar argument, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review 101–04, 116–20 (Harvard 1980) (justifying judicial review as necessary to
reinforce democratic representation and the equality of the vote on which it should rely).
43 See id at 101–04.
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In its simplest form, a constitutional commitment to selfsustaining democracy prohibits an elected leader from simply
abolishing future elections. In its more complicated form, a constitutional commitment to self-sustaining democracy requires
that leaders be prohibited from hampering the institutional prerequisites for free and fair elections, among which are a pluralistic media, a range of effective parties, an independent judiciary,
recognition of a legitimate and loyal opposition, neutral election
officials, a system of representation that does not unduly dilute
the powers of minorities, and legally accountable police and security services, as well as a free and active civil society—all of which
should have constitutional protection for a democracy to be considered self-sustaining. In its even more substantive varieties,
democratic constitutionalism is bound to honor what democratic
publics should want if they were able to follow liberal theoretical
commitments through from beginning to logical end point.44 Starting from liberal premises, it is possible to construct the arguments for both constitutionalism and democracy together.
Liberal constitutionalism is democracy reinforcing because it
binds all branches of government to two forms of constitutional constraint: (1) requirements that the state protect and defend the dignity and liberty of individuals so that they may sustain, among other
things, the capacities to be democratic citizens; and (2) requirements that all sources of public power be subject to binding legal
checks that, among other things, ensure that leaders stay within
legal limits and guarantee the orderly rotation of leadership in
response to shifting democratic majorities. If democratic constitutionalism ensures that the continued responsiveness of leadership to electoral choice remains a higher-order value such that
the winner of an individual election cannot displace it, then liberal constitutionalism sustains the institutional channels
through these choices as they occur and are translated into state
action, and it provides continuing guarantees that the dignity and
liberty of electoral and other minorities are accorded respect and
protection. Because liberalism plays such a large role in this story
of constitutional hijacking, it is worth recalling what liberalism is
and is not. I use the term “liberal” as a description of a family of
political philosophies, which does not mean—as it does in everyday speech in America—that politicians are, or should be, on the
Left. Liberalism grows from the Enlightenment struggle for the
44 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 195–200 (Belknap 1971) (defending a specific
set of political values that liberals should want, among which are liberty and equality, and
specific ways of reconciling the conflicts between the two).
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recognition of the rights of individuals, including their right to be
governed under self-limiting and checked authority, authority
that has as its normative touchstone legitimation through democratic means.45 The era of democratic and liberal constitutionalism began in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century
in political thought, picked up normative steam in actually existing politics with the birth of self-made government in the French
and American Revolutions, was the aspiration behind many
failed efforts to cast aside monarchies in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and became normatively dominant in the
“First World” after World War II.46 With the collapse of the Soviet
Union (the “Second World” against which the “First World” had
defined itself) and with the emergence of democratic governments
first in Latin America and then in Africa, liberal and democratic
constitutionalism has become the normative model for virtually
all states emerging from autocratic rule.47 Liberalism as a governing political philosophy has both left and right variants, but it can
be identified by its core commitments to the dignity and liberty of
individuals and their democratic governance by self-limiting and
accountable political power. I use “liberal” in this sense throughout this Essay. The destruction of liberalism in nominally democratic and constitutional governments is a big deal.
Liberalism animated the “rise of world constitutionalism.”48
After the waves of democratization that started in the 1970s, liberal and democratic constitutionalism came to be taken for
granted as the end point of the evolutionary trajectory of the modern state.49 Holding elections, writing constitutions, guaranteeing
the integrity of these constitutions through judicial review, establishing the multi-institutional protection of rights, and ensuring
checked and balanced powers of government became such an automatic script for new democracies that “the end of history”
seemed to have arrived.50 Francis Fukuyama gave voice to the
45

See Alan Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism 23–38 (Princeton 2012).
See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The Agendas of Comparative Constitutionalism, 13 L & Cts 5 (Spring 2003).
47 See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va L Rev 771,
772 (1997).
48 Id.
49 See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 3–15 (Johns
Hopkins 1996) (describing the process of the consolidation of democratic states through
three waves of democratization in Southern Europe, Latin America, and then Eastern
Europe, though admitting that these new democracies might at some point break down).
50 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 Natl Interest 3, 3–4 (Summer 1989).
Fukuyama’s essay seems like such a touchstone of this new era because it captured a
46
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view that liberal and democratic constitutionalism was “the end
point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”51 And there was no turning back. The associated political
science concept of the “consolidated democracy” cooked into its
definition that democracy would be “the only game in town.”52
And so it seemed, after so many authoritarian regimes were
rejected in the last decades of the twentieth century, that democratic and liberal constitutionalism was the fate of the world.
Democratic constitutionalism honored democracy by channeling
it through institutions that would enable it to be self-sustaining.
Liberal constitutionalism honored the rights of individuals by setting limits on what governments could do in the name of majorities and requiring that the institutions of a democratic state remain accountable and limited. Democratic and liberal
constitutionalism put democratic electorates in charge of their
own destiny, with political power controlled and checked in ways
that would guarantee the continued respect for individuals and
their ideas about self-governance.
Until recently, illiberal leaders rejected liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy as a package. The classic twentiethcentury dictators opposed “liberal democracy” in favor of invocations
of “peoples’ democracies” steered by a “vanguard party.”53 Some encouraged the belief that they alone could channel “the people,”

widespread sense that the one true model of government had arrived, a model that guaranteed human freedom. But in saying this, Fukuyama repeated a theme that had been
devised and refined throughout the Enlightenment, starting with Kant’s positing of freedom as existing outside of time, through Hegel’s belief that freedom existed at the end of
history, through Marx’s mirror-image belief that freedom lay at the end of a process of
historical class struggle. Continental political thought was long animated by the belief
that history could be described by a narrative of progress, at the end of which was human
freedom. See John McCumber, Time and Philosophy: A History of Continental Thought
19–21, 46–49, 57–76 (Routledge 2003). It seemed to many observers in 1989 that this moment had actually arrived despite its always having been a fictional construction.
51 Fukuyama, 16 Natl Interest at 4 (cited in note 50).
52 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation at 5 (cited
in note 49).
53 Vladimir Lenin developed the idea of the vanguard party and called his preferred
form of government Social Democracy. See Vladimir Lenin, What Is to Be Done? *23, 55,
70–81 (Marxists Internet Archive 1902) (Chris Russell, ed), archived at
http://perma.cc/7XFU-R5PE. The term “people’s democracies” replaced Lenin’s term after World War II as the field of scientific communism became a school subject in Sovietinflected states. For one early statement of its tenets, see generally The Character of a
“People’s Democracy,” 28 Foreign Aff 143 (1949).
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surrounded by adoring masses because they were self-evidently articulating the popular will.54 There was no need for free and fair
elections when the people spoke either through a vanguard party
representing their interests or through a leader who was their
emanation. In the name of “the people,” dictators openly engaged
in mass human-rights violations to remove enemies. They attacked constitutionalism and its valorization of self-limiting government power.55
Political orientation in such a black-and-white world used to
be easy. Liberals were in favor of constitutionalism and democracy, and illiberals were against both. One could therefore reliably guess that a democratic and constitutional government would
necessarily be liberal in practice. But that is precisely what autocratic legalism changes.
It has been said that hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays
to virtue,56 so it was only a matter of time before the normative
consensus around liberal and democratic constitutionalism fell
under the sway of new and clever leaders who embraced the outer
appearances of both democracy and constitutionalism while hollowing out their liberal content. The new legalistic autocrats enthusiastically support elections and use their electoral victories
54 Young theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer coined the term Führer Princip to characterize Adolf Hitler’s hold on the German public. In a radio address on February 1, 1933,
only two days after Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, Bonhoeffer spoke on “The
Younger Generation’s Altered View of the Concept of Führer.” The radio broadcast was
cut off in midstream by censors. The closest text we have to Bonhoeffer’s account of the
Führer Princip is a draft that approximates the one read on the radio in which Bonhoeffer
noted: “This leader, arising from the collective power of the people, now appears in the
light as the one awaited by the people, the longed-for fulfillment of the meaning and power
of the life of the Volk.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Führer and the Younger Generation, in
Carsten Nicolaisen and Ernst-Albert Scharffenorth, eds, 12 Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works,
Berlin: 1932–1933 268, 278 (Fortress 2009).
55 Professor Stephen Kotkin summarized Lenin’s views. Stephen Kotkin, 1 Stalin:
Paradoxes of Power, 1878–1928 410 (Penguin 2014):

Lenin railed against the idea that every society was made up of multiple interests that deserved competitive political representation and balancing as naively
inviting in the “wrong” interests (“bourgeois” or “petit bourgeois”). He repudiated
any separation of powers among executive, legislative, and judicial branches as
a bourgeois sham. He rejected the rule of law as an instrument of class domination, not a protection against the state. He dismissed the self-organization of
society to hold the state in check. The upshot was a brutal intensification of tsarism’s many debilitating features: emasculation of parliament, metastasizing of
parasitic state functionaries, persecution and shakedowns of private citizens
and entrepreneurs—in short, unaccountable executive power, which was vastly
enhanced in its grim arbitrariness by a radiant ideology of social justice and
progress.
56 The maxim is from François duc de La Rochefoucauld, The Maxims of La
Rochefoucauld 73 (Random House 1959) (Louis Kronenberger, trans).
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to legitimate their legal reforms. They use constitutional change
as their preferred vehicle for achieving the unified domination of
all of the institutions of state. Like the hypocrite, the legalistic
autocrats befuddle their critics by pretending to support many of
the same values their critics do. And, like the hypocrite’s misleading statements, their deployment of public values is meant to disguise that they intend just the opposite.
Prime Minister Orbán in Hungary may be perhaps the least
hypocritical among the new legalistic autocrats because he has
openly embraced the “illiberal state,”57 but President Putin in
Russia, President Erdoğan in Turkey, Jarosław Kaczyński in
Poland, and President Chávez in Venezuela share a family resemblance with Orbán and his embrace of constitutional forms and
democratic legitimation to hide something more deeply illiberal.
They, too, insist that the majorities—real or apparent—that
brought them to power can justify anything that they do, that minority rights merely reflect illegitimate political correctness, that
checked and balanced powers give unwarranted strength to their
opponents who (after all) were losers, and that constitutional accountability and limited government are unnecessary when so
much has to be done. Rather than rejecting the language of constitutionalism and democracy in the name of a grand ideology as
their authoritarian forebears did, the new legalistic autocrats embrace constitutional and democratic language while skipping any
commitment to the liberal values that gave meaning to those
words.
Instead of operating in the world of liberalism, then, autocratic legalists operate in the world of legalism. Liberal, democratic constitutionalism as a normative political theory is committed to the protection of rights, to checked power, to the defense of
the rule of law, and to liberal values of toleration, pluralism, and
equality. By contrast, legalism’s requirements are simply formal:
law meets a positivist standard for enactment as a technical matter when it follows the rules laid down, regardless of the content

57 Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of
26 July 2014 (Budapest Beacon, July 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/2N4Q-5N35:

[The] Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that
needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new
state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not
deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc. But it does not make this
ideology a central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national,
particular approach in its stead.
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or value commitments of those laws.58 Laws that meet the test of
legalism are enacted according to law; laws that meet the test of
constitutionalism must substantively comply with the principles
of a liberal legal order. When legality undermines constitutionalism, it is because the values of the new laws have superseded the
values of constitutionalism rather than the other way around, as
constitutionalism itself requires. The cure for laws that violate
constitutional values is to nullify them as unconstitutional, which
is one reason why some of the autocratic legalists begin their
power grabs by disabling constitutional courts.59 But even when
legalism undermines constitutionalism, it provides a backhanded
tribute to the very constitutionalism it undermines. If making
laws in a proper way were not so important for generating political legitimacy, the autocrats would not have bothered being so
legalistic. Instead, they are trying to capitalize on the normative
force of formal constitutional procedures in order to justify their
actions.
To maintain liberal, democratic constitutionalism, however,
a constitutional system must be able to separate the rules of the
game from the game, so constitutional structures themselves
must be protected outside the playing field of normal politics.
There are many ways to do this—for example, creating high-bar
amendment rules for constitutions,60 entrenching strong forms of

58 Perhaps the best account of legal positivism and its limits can be found in the
Hart-Fuller debate of 1958. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 Harv L Rev 593 (1957) (defending the insistence of positivist jurisprudence to distinguish the law as it is from the law as it should be); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—a Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv L Rev 630 (1957) (criticizing Hart’s distinction of what the law is and what the law ought to be).
59 The constitutional court was the first target in both Hungary and Poland. See
notes 24–25 and accompanying text. See also Pech and Scheppele, Illiberalism Within at
*3–4 (cited in note 23).
60 A surprising number of constitutions feature “eternity clauses” that prevent certain features from ever being amended. See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers 5–7 (Oxford 2017) (describing various
kinds of clauses that themselves restrict how constitutions can be amended, leading to the
phenomenon of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment). But at a minimum, constitutional amendment typically requires supermajorities, time delays, and other rules
designed to slow down and make more difficult the process of changing constitutional
norms. Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49 Wake Forest
L Rev 913, 922–23 (2014).
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judicial review,61 or nurturing a political culture that keeps politics within bounds.62 Within the purview of liberal, democratic
constitutionalism, democratically elected leaders may not legitimately attack these constraints, even citing a democratic mandate, unless supermajorities over a sustained period support the
changes and respect the views of those who disagree.63
In what I have just argued, however, the careful reader will
have noticed a certain lack of specificity about what precise norms
and institutions a liberal constitutional democracy must contain.
Instead, you will find a proliferation of versions of what a liberal
constitutional democracy could be. It is fiendishly difficult to come
up with a one-size-fits-all account of liberal constitutional democracy that has concrete purchase when one considers actually existing constitutional orders. There are many variants of the phenomenon with very different institutional and legal
specifications. The United Kingdom has traditionally had little
separation of powers, with the Parliament (itself not entirely
democratically elected) not only exercising control over the functional executive but also having the last word against the intrusions of courts.64 The United States has rather a lot of separation
of powers, with an elected president and separate electoral bases
for each house of Congress, accompanied by strong judicial review.65 And yet both the United Kingdom and the United States
are liberal, constitutional democracies. The variation extends to
rights: Germany famously and constitutionally criminalizes not
only hate speech but also Holocaust denial, while the US constitutionally defends both.66 Italian constitutional law protects the
statute of limitations as a substantive right while other European
61 Professor Mark Tushnet distinguishes between “strong form” judicial review that
cannot be overridden by parliaments and “weak form” review that can. See Mark Tushnet,
Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative
Constitutional Law ix–xi, 18–42 (Princeton 2008).
62 “Political constitutionalism” describes a constitutional system that relies on political culture lodged in a supreme parliament to keep constitutional culture intact instead
of relying on judicial review lodged in courts. See Marco Goldoni, Constitutional Reasoning
According to Political Constitutionalism: Comment on Richard Bellamy, 14 Ger L J 1053,
1053–62 (2013).
63 I have developed my theory of legitimate constitutional change. See generally
Scheppele, Unconstitutional Constituent Power (cited in note 35).
64 Not only does the prime minister have to gain and keep the confidence of the
Parliament, but no court may nullify an act of the Westminster Parliament for unconstitutionality. See A.W. Heringa and Ph. Kiiver, Constitutions Compared: An Introduction to
Comparative Constitutional Law 37–38 (Intersentia 3d ed 2012).
65 Id at 28–30.
66 See Winfried Brugger, The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional
Law (Part I), 4 Ger L J 1, 11–14 (2003).
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constitutional systems see time limits on the prosecution of crime
as a procedural protection that can be overridden when the substance is sufficiently important.67 And yet all are liberal, constitutional democracies. In the abstract, these systems share common
values at some deeper level; in practice, they vary a great deal in
the particular institutional forms as well as in the detailed constitutional doctrines that ensure the realization of these values,
so much so that difference seems even larger than commonality
up close. With regard to liberal, democratic constitutionalism,
then, one might reverse the famous aphorism of Karl Marx: “All
that is air melts once it becomes solid.”68
Therein lies an opportunity, which the legalistic autocrats
know full well. They have learned to speak the language of democratic constitutionalism while identifying its resonant-frequency
points of tension and complexity in order to reverse its effects.
When one points out that the legalistic autocrats have gutted liberalism in their defense of democracy, they point to examples in
which some other constitutional democracy has done the same
thing on some particular point without being attacked as a failed
democratic or constitutional state. For example, the US engages
in rampant gerrymandering,69 yet few think it is not a democracy
or a constitutional one at that.70 Yet the Hungarian government

67 See Federico Fabbrini and Oreste Pollicino, Constitutional Identity in Italy: European Integration as the Fulfilment of the Constitution *11–14 (European University Institute Working Papers, June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/DD29-WBBD (describing
the Taricco litigation at the European Court of Justice and the conflict between the Italian
rules on statutes of limitations and European norms).
68 The original quote is “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned,
and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his
relations with his kind.” Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist
Party (Marxist Internet Archive, 2000) (Samuel Moore, trans), archived at
http://perma.cc/526D-9ZHK.
69 See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 Stan L Rev 1263, 1267–69 (2016).
70 Elections are, of course, flawed. See Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, United States of America—General Election, 8 November 2016: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions *1 (Nov 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5XKY-M2PL:

The 8 November general elections were highly competitive and demonstrated
commitment to fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly and association.
The presidential campaign was characterized by harsh personal attacks, as well
as intolerant rhetoric by one candidate. Diverse media coverage allowed voters
to make an informed choice. Recent legal changes and decisions on technical
aspects of the electoral process were often motivated by partisan interests, adding undue obstacles for voters. Suffrage rights are not guaranteed for all citizens,
leaving sections of the population without the right to vote. . . . While districts
generally ensure equality of the vote, many [Election Observer Mission] interlocutors reiterated longstanding concerns that redistricting is a largely partisan
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gerrymandered the whole country before the 2014 election and
also rewrote the whole system of election rules that appear to
mimic those rules in good democracies.71 The overall result was to
rig the election so that the governing party could maintain its
two-thirds parliamentary supermajority on an even smaller number of the votes,72 which made Hungary more autocratic than
democratic.
Worse yet, the legalistic autocrats may be right about the
logic of comparison. They can point to the one feature they copied
from a good country to bad effect while omitting from their reforms the supporting features that the other system used to compensate for the flawed feature they borrowed. Yes, the United
States engages in gerrymandering, but it does so for national elections in fifty different state processes (rather than in the whole
country at once), with a requirement of near-equality in district
sizes (unless one of a few compelling reasons to deviate can be
demonstrated). These rules provide some limits to gerrymandering,73 backed by some judicial review to rein in most egregious
cases.74 Yes, the Germans have wide variation in the size of their
electoral districts, permitting up to 15 percent variation above
and below the mean district size, but strict proportional representation in the distribution of the party list seats in the parliament
process, which has led to a number of uncompetitive contests. In these elections,
28 candidates for the House ran unopposed.
71

See Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2 (cited in note 11).
“Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal.
But smoke and mirrors.” Kim Lane Scheppele, Miklós Bánkuti, and Zoltán Réti, Legal but
Not Fair (Hungary) (NY Times, Apr 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WL22-NQ5M.
73 The Supreme Court had occasion to revisit the equal-district-size standard recently in the context of reviewing a nonpartisan commission’s plan. See Harris v Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, 136 S Ct 1301, 1306 (2014) (citations omitted):
72

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires States to “make
an honest and good faith effort to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of
equal population as is practicable.” . . . The Constitution, however, does not demand mathematical perfection. In determining what is “practicable,” we have
recognized that the Constitution permits deviation when it is justified by “legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.” . . .
In related contexts, we have made clear that in addition to the “traditional districting principles such as compactness [and] contiguity,” . . . those legitimate
considerations can include a state interest in maintaining the integrity of political subdivisions, . . . or the competitive balance among political parties.
74 See Wang, 68 Stan L Rev at 1270–80 (cited in note 69). As I write, the US Supreme
Court has before it Gill v Whitford, a case that raises the question of how overt and skewed
partisan gerrymandering can be before it becomes unconstitutional. For a summary of the
arguments presented to the Court, see Amy Howe, Argument Preview: The Justices Tackle
Partisan Gerrymandering Again (SCOTUSblog, Sept 26, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/3SDQ-Z6DT.
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makes the overall result match the national distribution of the
public support for parties.75 If a legalistic autocrat strings together US gerrymandering with the permitted German variation
in district sizes, however, then he can steal an election.76 Legalistic autocrats become adept at culling the worst practices from liberal democracies to create something illiberal and monstrous
when stitched together.77
In addition to adopting the worst practices from tolerably
good systems, autocratic legalists have learned how to undermine
liberalism itself by pressing on the points of tension between different theories of liberalism. Liberal values do indeed at times
come into conflict. For example, some legalistic autocrats defend
their own anti-liberal views by arguing that their opponents believe in illiberal political correctness, while only they defend truly
liberal free speech. For example, Orbán perfected this sort of argument to claim the high ground on rights: “[P]olitical correctness
transformed the European Union into a kind of royal court where
everybody must behave well. . . . Liberalism today no longer
stands for freedom but for political correctness, which is antithetical to freedom.”78
In this, Orbán is not alone. His fellow legalistic autocrats sing
the same song.79 They mistake the conflict between two values—

75 See Germany: Delimiting Districts in a Mixed Member Proportional Electoral System (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/72MR-H852.
76 See note 11 and accompanying text. See also Scheppele, Hungary: An Election in
Question, Part 1 (cited in note 11).
77 See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why
Governance Checklists Do Not Work, 26 Governance 559 (2013).
78 Éva Balogh, Trump and Orbán on Political Correctness (Hungarian Spectrum, Dec
2, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/76NF-DXGL. Éva Balogh usefully summarized the
evolution of Orbán’s uses of “political correctness”: In 2012, Orbán blamed political correctness for blocking discussion of “things that are essential to the very core of our civilization.” Then a year later, he said that “the long-term decline of Europe” could not be
“debated openly” due to political correctness. By 2014, Orbán identified political correctness with liberal democracy, which he said was “a political system riddled with taboos.” In
2015, he said that political correctness was responsible for Europe’s inability to defend itself
against the incoming wave of refugees. And then he claimed that the entire Hungarian public was politically incorrect: “The Hungarian people by nature are politically incorrect, i.e.,
they haven’t lost their sanity. They are not interested in bullshit [duma], they are interested in facts. They want results, not theories.” Id.
79 One of the Kremlin’s favorite journalists, Dmitry Kiselev, recently wrote: “East
and west appear to be trading places. In Russia we now take full advantage of freedom of
speech, whereas in the west political correctness, or political expediency in the name of
security, have become arguments against freedom of speech.” Dmitry Kiselev, Russia and
the West Are Trading Places on Freedom of Speech (The Guardian, Apr 10, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/GK6K-Q8XF.
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freedom of speech and respect for the dignity of others—for a fight
between liberalism and illiberalism.
Autocratic legalists claim their legitimacy from having won
elections (as constitutional liberals do), but then autocratic legalists leverage the power of their resulting parliamentary majorities to silence the opposition. The Polish government elected in
2015 has claimed it is entitled to rid all branches of government
of the “postcommunists” (where “postcommunist” identifies the
center-left opposition and is, in their usage, a code for former communists).80 They even have a campaign against the previous
prime minister as a postcommunist traitor, despite the fact that
he is president of the European Council, an unlikely position for
a dangerous communist.81 We’ve seen a similar logic as the advocates of Brexit (known as Brexiteers in the United Kingdom) have
used some of the same strategies as the autocratic legalists by
invoking the results of a deeply unclear plebiscite to prevent
meaningful debate either about what the first plebiscite meant or
about whether a second plebiscite would be a worthwhile endeavor, claiming the superior democratic authenticity of the first
and shouting down all who have the temerity to disagree.82
When they rewrite constitutions, autocratic legalists invoke
their electoral (and therefore, in their view, democratic) legitimacy
as they create an illiberal state. They develop a constitutionmaking process justified in the name of the majority, without including any views of the minority, and voilà! A new constitutional

80 Poland’s Government Is Putting the Courts under Its Control (The Economist, July
22, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7E5W-6MKV.
81 Poland Has Reinforced Its Position as Europe’s Problem Child (The Economist,
Mar 16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8UAH-4FP2.
82 For example, the pro-Brexit online magazine Spiked minced no words. Citing
George Orwell on language, the deputy editor of the journal began his article attacking
the British proponents of a second Brexit referendum: “We can’t let the enemies of democracy pose as its guardians.” Tom Slater, No, a Second Referendum Would Not Be More
Democratic (Spiked, Aug 10, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/98GF-9QCP. Critics of the
Polish PiS government have been similarly attacked when the government asserts that
the democratic public has spoken through the last election and therefore no one may question what the public wanted. For example, according to the president of a major civilsociety foundation in Poland, speaking of the PiS government: “Their attitude is that every
four years there are elections, but afterwards the party that has won the election should
have full power, practically unlimited.” Rick Lyman and Joanna Berendt, As Poland
Lurches to Right, Many in Europe Look on in Alarm (NY Times, Dec 14, 2015), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/europe/poland-law-and-justice-party-jaroslaw
-kaczynski.html?_r=0 (visited Oct 30, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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order is born. Orbán, Chávez, and Correa all wrote new constitutions soon after they took office.83 Erdoğan waited years and
amassed power gradually through a series of constitutional referenda, amending the Turkish constitution repeatedly to steadily
concentrate executive power in a newly refurbished presidency.
Finally, Erdoğan put to a popular referendum in April 2017 a set
of constitutional amendments that consolidated immense power
in the presidency whose incumbent would have the ability to stay
in office until 2029, and perhaps even to 2034.84 The 2017 referendum proposals eliminated the position of prime minister and
gave all executive power to the president, including the power to
issue wide-ranging decrees with legal effect.85 The power of the
parliament to act in cases when the president would object to its
direction was also reduced, and the amendments also bolstered
the president’s legal ability to control the appointment of judges.86
Erdoğan’s constitutional program passed by 51 percent to 49 percent.87 The autocratic legalists often make a giant public show of
being governed by and governing within the law, changing the
law and even the constitution itself with impeccably legal (if illiberal) methods. But underneath the legal reforms carried out in
the name of democracy is the illiberal sensibility of the autocrat
and the steady consolidation of power in fewer and fewer hands.
As this evidence reveals, liberal constitutionalism becomes
endangered when the rules of the game are themselves gamed.
This can occur, and often does, even before a charismatic leader’s
campaign to sweep away “all that” becomes powerful enough to
win elections. Alexis de Tocqueville’s explanation of the French
Revolution is generalizable: for a revolution to topple the ancien
régime, the ancien régime must have already been hollowed out
from within.88 A revolution, in Tocqueville’s account, is therefore
the final and not the first stage of political transformation. The
modern legalistic autocrat who can quickly disable a liberal,
democratic, constitutionalist political order is generally simply

83 See Scheppele, Understanding Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution at 111–13
(cited in note 9); Landau, 47 UC Davis L Rev at 203 (cited in note 29); de la Torre, 24 J
Democracy at 34 (cited in note 33).
84 See Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci, The Turkish Constitutional Referendum, Explained (Brookings, Apr 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8KAL-UR4G.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Kareem Shaheen, Erdoğan Clinches Victory in Turkish Constitutional Referendum (The Guardian, Apr 16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/UX5P-V9CW.
88 See Jon Elster, ed, Tocqueville: The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution 170–
85 (Cambridge 2011) (Arthur Goldhammer, trans).
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taking in the political harvest others have planted. Or, he is taking advantage of structural weaknesses that exist in many complex constitutional systems that give him the possibility of exploiting contradictions in the system for his own benefit. Bringing
down a healthy constitutional, democratic, liberal order is not so
easy unless the system is already weakened before the attempt.
Revolutions in the name of democracy can sweep away desiccated illiberal constitutional orders, as occurred in the late
eighteenth-century revolutions. But sometimes revolutions in the
name of democracy can sweep away desiccated liberal constitutional orders, as well. Trying to stop the masses with appeals to
constitutionalism does not always work because the restraints of
liberalism are not always democratically appealing when there
seems to be a crisis—of events, of confidence, of an approaching
enemy. Democracy without liberal constitutional constraint can
degenerate quickly into pure majoritarianism, in which the rights
of minorities are not recognized and in which leaders convert
transient majorities into permanent authorizations to rule. Illiberal revolutions can be very powerful. They can destroy fragile liberal and constitutional principles in a spasm of apparent
democracy.
Within the general phenomenon of democratic decline, then,
some cases are particularly challenging because they pit a purely
majoritarian conception of democracy harnessed to formally legal
change against a more complex and often internally contradictory
liberal constitutional order. The new autocrats, to be sure, are not
liberals. Their anti-liberalism can come from the right (Orbán in
Hungary and Kaczyński in Poland), from the left (Chávez and his
successor Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Correa in Ecuador),
and from some combination of religiosity and nationalism (Putin
in Russia and Erdoğan in Turkey). Regardless of the source of
their anti-liberal political views, however, these new autocrats
are similar in that they use their democratic mandates to dismantle constitutional constraints. Professor Jan-Werner Müller has
called this phenomenon “constitutional capture”89 because the
new autocrats precisely target the features of the constitutional
order that will ultimately stand in the way of their domination of
the political space.

89 According to Müller, “Constitutional capture aims at systematically weakening
checks and balances and, in the extreme case, making genuine changes in power exceedingly difficult.” Jan-Werner Müller, Rising to the Challenge of Constitutional Capture (Eurozine, Mar 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NWB7-ZVKW.
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Because the legalistic autocrats deploy the rhetoric of democracy and the methods of the law, observers find it hard to see the
danger until it is too late. The next Part turns to the question of
how we might identify legalistic autocrats in time to limit the
damage they can do.
III. THE TACTICS OF THE LEGAL AUTOCRATS
How do the new autocrats get away with transforming liberal
democratic constitutionalism into pure majoritarian legalism?
This Part shows precisely how the new autocrats hide what they
are doing under the cover of conforming rhetoric and how they
use liberal methods to achieve their illiberal results. The combination disarms their critics and allows them to entrench their
rule.
The first trick of the new autocrats involves reliance on stickfigure stereotypes about illiberalism that are in people’s heads.
The catastrophic twentieth-century authoritarianisms are customarily portrayed in particular ways, and many people are educated into these particular narratives of what counts as a danger
signal that authoritarianism is on the horizon. Legalistic autocrats then do something very different to consolidate their power
so that they can say that they are not authoritarians. In a world
in which the villains of the twentieth century come prepackaged
in particular narratives, the new villains of the twenty-first century go out of their way to avoid the unflattering comparison.
There’s the Hitler scenario:90 A leader motivated by an overwhelming ideology comes to power and arranges to have a state
of emergency declared, perhaps because of a transformative event
(for example, the Reichstag fire) that the leader’s supporters may
well have staged.91 The emergency provides cover for disabling
the guardians at the barricades of constitutionalism. Rights are
suspended and parliamentary power usurped. Paramilitaries
take over from the normal civilian institutions of state.92 The
leader blames a domestic enemy and soon scapegoats part of the
population as an excuse for depriving that group of its rights.93

90 The scenario is summarized from the narrative in Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional
Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies 29–74 (Transaction 2002)
(originally published 1948) (blaming Hitler’s rise to power on the unconstrained use of
emergency powers).
91 How Hitler Consolidated Power 1933–1934 (BBC, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/BY25-AU92.
92 See Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship at 43 (cited in note 90).
93 Id at 61–62.
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The threat of internal enemies mobilizes the rest of the population to withdraw support from their fellow citizens, who then become vulnerable to even more extreme rights violations. Eventually, the leader leads the country into war.94 The war provides
cover for genocide and other massive violations of human rights,
portrayed as the reason why the authoritarian wanted power in
the first place.
Then there’s the Stalin scenario: A leader motivated by another overwhelming ideology fights his way to the top using “ideology, trickery, and violence.”95 He ruthlessly sidelines all rivals;
he consolidates control first over the Party, then over the country.96 The entrenchment of his regime kills millions while the imprisonment, torture, and execution of dissidents occurs on a truly
vast scale.97 He destroys the preexisting institutions and governs
ruthlessly without limit by capturing the state for repressive purposes.98 Freedom is extinguished, and rights are honored only in
the breach.
In both stick-figure scenarios, the concentration of power is
brutal, complete, and completely obvious. Both narratives feature
leaders who justify what they are doing in the name of a strong
authoritarian ideology. The onset of authoritarianism is accompanied by the violent takeover and destruction of the previous political institutions. The agents of destruction are irregular paramilitaries, secret police, and party organs who come from outside
the system to crush it. Authoritarian leaders reduce those around
them to puppets, brook no dissent, and leave no opposition standing. They monopolize power and destroy all semblances of pluralism as well as all claims to rights. Authoritarianism’s signature
is the violation of human rights on a mass scale. When these
things happen, you know you are in trouble.
Of course, history is more complicated than either scenario,
and that is precisely the point. The bite-sized takeaway lessons

94 Id at 31–32, 49–50. See also Who Was to Blame for WW2? (BBC, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/CVF4-CCNU.
95 This narrative draws from the popular summary provided by the BBC in its history program for British schools. See Stalin’s Takeover of Power *3 (BBC, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/8TVC-XABG.
96 See id at *1–2.
97 See
Stalin—Purges and Praises *1 (BBC, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/DS3G-KQ86.
98 Stalin—Collectivisation (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/MSK5-GDCF; Stalin—
the Five-Year Plans (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/KXR9-D57H; Stalin—Monster or
Necessary Evil? (BBC), archived at http://perma.cc/383D-JMAD.
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from the two signature authoritarianisms of the twentieth century constitute the modern repertoire of signals that the public
will recognize as dangerous. These standard lessons learned from
a complex history are often quite simple, and that leaves a lot of
room to repeat history using some of the less well-known subplots.
The bite-sized takeaway lessons from the two signature authoritarians of the twentieth century constitute the modern repertoire
of signals that the public will recognize as dangerous. The problem is that people overlearn the simple lessons and believe that
unless those precise things happen, the danger is not very great.
The new autocrats know this and avoid repeating those wellknown scenarios that will attract immediate and overwhelming
reaction. They take a kinder, gentler, but, in the end, also destructive path. They masquerade as democrats and govern in the name
of their democratic mandates.99 They don’t destroy state institutions; they repurpose rather than abolish the institutions they inherited.100 Their weapons are laws, constitutional revision, and

99 As President Erdoğan himself said on the one-year anniversary of the attempted
coup that caused him to introduce an enduring state of emergency:

Since its rise to power in 2002, the Justice and Development party (AKP), which
I lead, has implemented reforms to empower elected officials at the expense of
certain groups within the military. In doing so we have been able to restore the
Turkish people’s confidence in public institutions. . . . This connection between
the people and their government is the ultimate measure of our democracy’s resilience, and the strongest guarantee of its survival.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey, a Year after the Attempted Coup, Is Defending Democratic
Values (The Guardian, July 15, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/649S-KHDL.
And then, without the slightest trace of irony, he added that the popular uprising
against the coup-plotters was a sign that democracy worked: “The thwarting of the coup
marked a turning point in the history of democracy; it will be a source of hope and inspiration for all peoples who live under dictators.” Id.
100 Prime Minister Orbán established control over the ordinary judiciary in Hungary
by creating a new body, the National Judicial Office (NJO), to appoint, promote, demote,
discipline, reassign, and dismiss judges. The NJO replaced the prior body, the National
Judicial Council, with a name so similar that most people did not realize that the institution was wholly different. Moreover, despite the collective name, the new NJO consists of
one person—the best friend of the prime minister’s wife and the wife of the man who led
the team that drafted the new constitution. Unless someone were watching very closely,
nothing would have appeared to have changed even as the judicial selection process came
under direct political control. For a description of these judicial reforms, see Kim Lane
Scheppele, First Let’s Pick All the Judges (NY Times, Mar 10, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/W57G-6ATF. For condemnations of this arrangement, see generally International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute, Courting Controversy: The Impact of
Recent Reforms on the Independence of the Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Hungary (Sept
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/5Z3P-SJXE; Venice Commission, Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary That Were Amended following the Adoption of Opinion CDLAD(2012)001 (Oct 12–13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/VFM4-4AC4.

574

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:545

institutional reform.101 Their ideology is often flexible.102 And they
leave just enough dissent in play that they appear to be tolerant.
Instead of a scorched-earth policy that obliterates all opponents,
one will find in these autocratically legalistic regimes a handful
of small opposition newspapers, a few weak political parties, some
government-friendly NGOs, and perhaps even a visible dissident
or three (albeit always denigrated in the government-friendly media with compromising information—real or fake—so that hardly
anyone can take these dissidents seriously).103 There is no state of

101 In summer 2017, the PiS government in Poland launched an assault against the
judiciary in a very legal manner, through passage of a package of laws in the parliament.
The laws left intact all existing institutions, but removed all of their sitting occupants. See
Anna Sledzinska-Simon, The Polish Revolution (cited in note 25). The first law gave the
government the power to appoint presidents and vice presidents of all courts, dismissing
all those currently in place. The second bill fired the entire bench of supreme court judges,
plus the entire professional staff of the court, to give the government the power to appoint
all new judges. Finally, the third bill fired everyone in the council that appoints judges,
permitting the government to appoint its loyalists.
In the end, Polish President Andrzej Duda vetoed the two most controversial laws that
would have had the effect of firing all of the supreme court justices at once and giving the
government control over appointing authority for selecting new judges, but he signed the
law that allowed the Justice Minister to fire all of the court presidents below the level of
the supreme court. See Michał Broniatowski, Polish President Andrzej Duda to Veto Controversial Court Laws (Politico, July 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/BV36-7CLY.
Duda then countered with a draft law for capture of the supreme court that would result
in only 40 percent of the supreme court being removed immediately. See Paul Flückiger,
Poland’s Judicial Reform: Andrzej Duda’s Rash Proposal and Pullback (Deutsche Welle,
Sept 25, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/N7QM-AVWK. While it is clear that there is
some division within the PiS party on the way to accomplish the takeover of the judiciary,
the supreme court would not remain independent under any of the current proposals.
102 In fact, sometimes such leaders deny that they have any ideology. After President
Trump’s election in 2016, Orbán said:

The world has always benefited whenever it has managed to release itself from
the captivity of currently dominant ideological trends . . . . In my view, this is
what has happened just now in the United States. This also gives the rest of the
Western world the chance to free itself from the captivity of ideologies, of political correctness, and of modes of thought and expression which are remote from
reality: the chance to come back down to earth and see the world as it really is.
UK, Hungary Premiers Agree on Principle of Reciprocity (Hungary Today, Nov 10, 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/WMJ4-LD7P.
103 Hungary has mastered the art of keeping just enough dissent and pluralism in
play to not appear to be completely autocratic. But nonetheless democracy monitors have
noticed. While the broadcast media are nearly completely controlled by the government
and the largest circulation newspaper that printed news critical of the government was
closed without warning in 2016, a few opposition newspapers survive. Freedom House now
reports the Hungarian media scene as only “partly free.” Freedom of the Press 2017:
Hungary Profile (Freedom House, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5D65-7ZUJ. Political
parties that might challenge the Fidesz government are weak and disorganized, one reason why Freedom House demoted Hungary from the category of “consolidated democracy”
to the category of “semi-consolidated democracy” in 2015, as all scores related to Hungary’s
democratic health continue to decline precipitously. See Nations in Transit 2015, Hungary
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emergency, no mass violation of traditional rights.104 To the casual visitor who doesn’t pay close attention, a country in the grips
of an autocratic legalist looks perfectly normal. There are no
tanks in the streets.
The new autocrats achieve the look of normality by steering
clear of human-rights violations on a mass scale, at least those
human rights that have been entrenched in international conventions and many national constitutions. Instead, the new autocrats
eliminate their opponents by pressuring them differently: they
drive their opponents out of the country rather than jail them,
and they punish those who defy them through economic measures
that might easily be confused with bad luck in free markets.105
Country Profile (Freedom House, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SJ7F-QCJR; Nations
in Transit 2017, Hungary Country Profile (Freedom House, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/6YSK-BW8W. Civil-sector organizations critical of the Orbán government
have been subjected to waves of attacks. See Timeline of Governmental Attacks against
Hungarian Civil Society Organisations (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Apr 7, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/E7CL-YTFU. And yet, with all of these changes, Freedom House
still ranks Hungary overall as a “free” country because it has maintained just enough of
all of the key elements to keep its place in the highest category. Freedom in the World
2017: Hungary Profile (Freedom House, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/5FJD-PHL2.
104 That said, emergencies are not completely absent from the tools of governance in
these legalistically autocratic states. Turkey declared a state of emergency after the 2016
attempted coup and remains in that state as I write in January 2018. See Gabriela
Baczynksa, Europe Rights Watchdog Says Turkey’s Emergency Laws Go Too Far (Reuters,
Oct 6, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Z94J-WU89. Hungary declared a “migration state
of emergency” in 2015 that remains in force and gives the police extra powers to search
homes and create cordon zones, an emergency it keeps extending. Hungary Extends State
of Emergency Due to Migrant Crisis (Star Tribune, Aug 30, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/A57C-CD3H. Venezuela has resorted to a state of emergency as the political
crisis under President Maduro has worsened. See Venezuela Crisis: Maduro’s State of Emergency ‘Constitutional’ (BBC, May 20, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/FD5T-WCDA. But
in all of these cases, the states of emergency came late in the consolidation of power and
was not one of the first tools used to put in place the new autocratic system.
105 See, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary and the End of Politics (The
Nation, May 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S9GZ-YJXG:
Since Fidesz came to power, critics of the Hungarian government have been losing their jobs at an astonishing rate. The first to be fired were people who worked
in the state sector. Jobs always change hands as governing parties come and go,
but the civil service is typically protected from widespread political retaliation.
Not so in Hungary. As one of its first acts in office in May 2010, the Fidesz government altered the labor law that applied to the civil service. Suddenly, state
workers who once had substantial job protections could be fired for any reason—
or no reason at all. The thousands of state workers who lost their jobs in the
aftermath of this legal change were disproportionately those who opposed the
governing party. . . . By May 2011, the state sector had been almost completely
purged of opposition supporters. . . .
Since the first year of massive job losses, firings have spread beyond the state
sector. Private businesses that sought government contracts were told in a whisper campaign that they had to purge all government opponents from their workforces in order to be eligible contractors. This rule applied to projects funded by
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Opponents are fired from their jobs,106 denied social benefits for
technical reasons, and evicted from their buildings because of
small and technical violations.107 Owners of businesses that the
government wants to seize in order to redistribute to its own allies
are given offers that they cannot refuse.108 None of these measures
amount to serious rights violations because economic security, the
right to housing, the right to operate a business free of government inspections, the right to a free university education, or the
right to a basic income through either social welfare or pension
programs are not rights one can successfully claim in most
courts.109 Instead, the rights recognized by constitutions and
transnational human-rights instruments are the rights violated
by the great twentieth-century authoritarians who engaged in
the [European Union] as much as to ones supported by Hungarian taxpayer
money. Since roughly 50 percent of GDP is taken in and redistributed through
the state in Hungary, either through public-sector employment or public contracts to private businesses, the insistence by the Orbán government that all
private-sector businesses fire opposition supporters to make themselves eligible
for state contracts spread the economic pain far beyond the boundaries of the
state.
106

See, for example, id.
For example, in Russia, the European University of St. Petersburg was closed in a
swarm of technicalities. See Fred Weir, Why Is Someone Trying to Shutter One of Russia’s
Top Private Universities? (Christian Science Monitor, Mar 28, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/S5WK-AXV7:
107

Within weeks, 11 different agencies descended on the university to carry out
snap inspections, and they logged 120 violations of various rules and regulations.
None concerned the curriculum, and most were minor flaws in staff documentation, building code infractions, the lack of a stand displaying anti-alcohol information, and no fitness room for the staff. At the same time, the local real estate
authority filed a lawsuit demanding cancellation of the university’s rental permit over alleged failure to comply with some contract clauses.
108 See, for example, Bálint Magyar, Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of
Hungary 185 (CEU 2016):

Businessmen familiar with economic life in Hungary say that Fidesz has gained
control of three to four hundred private companies by force and blackmail since
it came to power. . . . [A]n alarming phenomenon has descended upon the world
of business activities, as the owners of prospering Hungarian businesses are approached by lawyers claiming affiliation to Fidesz, making an offer for the purchase of the company at a fraction of its real value, achieved often at the cost of
decades of hard work. The stealing of these companies, structurally supported
by the authorities can already mean a threat to family businesses with a turnover of a few hundred million forint, any downtown restaurant and better visited
hotel among them. If the owner does not wish to give up their business with a
major loss, the authorities soon make an appearance and make it impossible to
manage with various measures. Whether the offer is accepted is only a matter
of time.
109 See Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights at 170–72 (cited in note 61) (arguing
that weak rights are not guaranteed to be directly enforceable in court).
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genocide, political killings, imprisonment without trial, incommunicado detention, torture, censorship, seizure of property without
compensation, show trials, and searches of private homes.110
The new autocrats aim to capture and exercise unconstrained
power, but they have realized that they don’t need to annihilate
their opponents to do so. Rather, the reverse applies. In keeping
with their concern to maintain a legitimate public appearance, it
is positively useful for the new autocrats to appear to have some
democratic openness precisely so that they can claim that they
are not authoritarians of the twentieth-century sort.111 They
therefore tolerate a weakened opposition and other democratic
signs of life, such as a small critical press or a few opposition
NGOs, to demonstrate they have not completely smothered the
political environment with their autocracy.112

110 See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 44–45 (Belknap
2010) (showing how the current conception of human rights emerged from a Cold War
dynamic in which the signature violations of the Soviet Union were the primary target).
111 See, for example, Dimitry Trenin, Russia Is the House that Vladimir Putin Built—
and He’ll Never Abandon It (The Guardian, Mar 27, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/KPM7-XMFF:

An autocrat with the consent of the governed, Putin has preserved the essential
personal freedoms that the Russian people first earned with the demise of the
Communist system. People can worship and travel freely; Facebook and Twitter
are essentially unrestricted; there are even a few tolerated media outlets overtly
in opposition to the Kremlin. Political freedoms, however, are more tightly circumscribed, so as to leave no chance to potential “colour revolutionaries” or politically ambitious exiled oligarchs. For the bulk of the population, this matters
little; the relatively few activists have a choice of taking it—or leaving.
112 After detailing the methods through which the Fidesz Party in Hungary and the
PiS Party in Poland managed to consolidate their hold over the major media outlets while
leaving a few small venues for opposition views, Jakub Dymek and Zsolt Kapelner noted:

It is important to remember that all of this is happening not in far-away dictatorships or military autocracies. These are democratic countries, members of the
European Union, that ostensibly maintain the same standards as the UK or the
United States. Since the fall of communism, Poland in particular has presented
itself as a beacon of democracy and poster child for market reforms. Its rapid
backtracking on free expression reveals how quickly democracy can be hollowed
out even as its formal structures remain in place. Press freedom in Hungary and
Poland is suppressed not by decrees nor by threat of imprisonment or execution,
but by financial machinations, legislative maneuvers, and political pressure . . . .
The threat here is not so much that the propaganda’s message takes root instantly, although its effects are notable. The “effectiveness” of these moves is
measured more in how many can be fatigued into silence. The regime wins not
just when there is majority support for its agenda, but when the majority lacks
the interest, energy, or dedication to voice dissent . . . . Illiberal governments
triumph by making all media weaker, for their ultimate goal is to eliminate debate—not necessarily to win popular support.
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Of course, it is a sign of progress that the new autocrats steer
clear of mass human-rights violations and tolerate limited opposition; the human-rights movement has succeeded in many ways.
But the new autocrats have found new pressure points to sideline
their opponents that are clearly understood as coercive by those
targeted but that are not protected by constitutional rights. New
autocrats have learned that they can consolidate their power if
they can simply get their opponents to give up and go away, or
stay home and mind their own business. They don’t need to imprison or kill those who object to autocracy; they simply need to
get them to tolerate the diminished freedoms on offer.
The new autocrats will therefore not look like your father’s
authoritarians who want to smash the prior system in the name
of an all-encompassing ideology of transformation. Portraying
themselves as democratic constitutionalists is absolutely essential to their public legitimation; what is missing in the new democratic rhetoric is any respect for the basic tenets of liberalism.
They have no respect for minorities, pluralism, or toleration. They
do not believe that public power should be accountable or limited.
In short, liberalism is gutted by the new autocrats while they
leave the facades of constitutionalism and democracy in place.
Election opponents may be harassed with nuisance criminal
charges, but they do not wind up in jail, or at least not for long.113
Civil-society groups may be defunded, but they are not closed by
the government.114 The press that supports the opposition is not
censored, but it may be starved of advertising and then bought

Such subtle methods of oppression, manipulation, and domination are becoming the norm rather than the exception amid the nationalist and populist surge
in Eastern Europe today.
Jakub Dymek and Zsolt Kapelner, It Doesn’t Take a Dictator to Smother a Free Press
(Dissent, May 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/D2B6-MWBV.
113 See, for example, David M. Herszenhorn, Aleksei Navalny, Putin Critic, Is Spared
Prison in a Fraud Case, but His Brother Is Jailed (NY Times, Dec 30, 2014), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/world/europe/aleksei-navalny-convicted.html (visited
Sept 11, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the Russian government’s treatment of opposition figure Aleksei Navalny, who was jailed for failing to get permits for his
demonstrations and was eventually charged with the more serious but unrelated crime of
embezzlement; while he was given a suspended sentence in the end, his brother was arrested on apparently trumped-up charges, leading Navalny’s supporters to charge that the
Russian government was taking hostages).
114 See, for example, Aleksandra Eriksson, Hungary and Poland Risk Losing €1bn in
Norway Aid Row (EU Observer, May 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/HMR6-ATKD
(describing Hungary’s and Poland’s efforts to divert European Economic Area grant funding from organizations supporting human rights, women, gay people, and the homeless to
organizations that support the government).
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out by oligarchs connected to the winners.115 The elections that
keep the new autocrats in power are rigged in technical ways behind the scenes rather than through obvious tactics that can be
spotted by observers, such as ballot-box stuffing.116 Through these
nonviolent means, democracy is transformed into brute majoritarianism. The rigged elections—rigged in ways that election monitors cannot see—even prove that the public supports the autocrat!
What causes liberal constitutional democracies to fail?
Tocqueville’s diagnosis of what makes revolutions succeed is still
apt: liberal constitutionalism must have been ill long before the
disease became fatal, if it can be toppled so quickly. Critics can
disagree about when the illness began and what caused it, but
perhaps we can agree on what has accompanied the loss of support for both liberalism and constitutionalism: radical political
polarization,117 the rise of increasingly bad electoral choices,118 the
inability of party systems to handle shifts in voter preferences,119

115 See, for example, Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Free Media (NY Times, Mar 14,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/YKR2-4VC9 (describing how after the 2010 election, the
government, which was the biggest media advertiser, pulled its adds from opposition media and pressured private advertisers to follow suit by threatening the loss of government
contracts). Or the media are seized by oligarchs related to the governing party. See, for
example, Andrew Byrne, Hungary’s Largest Independent Newspaper Closed Down (Fin
Times, Oct 8, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2NNP-8D3K.
116 While in-person voter fraud and ballot-box stuffing can be caught by observers,
the new election rigging often occurs through manipulation of vote-counting software, invisible to election observers. See, for example, Venezuela’s Shameless and Colossal VoteRigging (The Economist, Aug 3, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/833M-QXYP (explaining that the government inflated turnout numbers to give the impression its new constitution was more widely supported); Scheppele, Hungary, an Election in Question, Part 2
(cited in note 11) (noting that Hungary’s government nationalized the previously independent company that developed the software for vote counting amid claims of a rigged
election). My Princeton colleagues Ed Felten and Andrew Appel have demonstrated how
relatively easy it is to hack the software in voting machines. See Ben Wofford, How to
Hack an Election Machine in 7 Minutes (Politico, Aug 5, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z8X8-UTF2.
117 See Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America:
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 1–16 (MIT 2d ed 2016). See also Emilia
Palonen, Political Polarisation and Populism in Contemporary Hungary, 62 Parliamentary Aff 318, 321 (2009) (arguing that polarization is a political tool in Hungary that
presents a problem for democracy, and was so even before Orbán’s election in 2010). For
Turkey, see E. Fuat Keyman, The AK Party: Dominant Party, New Turkey and Polarization, 16 Insight Turkey 19, 21 (Spring 2014).
118 See Zsolt Enyedi, Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The
Role of Party Politics in De-democratization, 63 Probs Post-Communism 210, 211 (2016).
119 See generally Robin E. Best, How Party System Fragmentation Has Altered Political Opposition in Established Democracies, 48 Govt & Opposition 314 (2013).
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the resistance of economic policy to the rotations of ordinary elections,120 political fallout from traumatic economic shocks,121 the
politicization of the judiciary,122 corrupt agreements among political elites,123 and more.
Eventually—and this is the story in many of the places where
the new autocrats eventually win elections—a dysfunction in the
party system allows a mainstream political party to be captured124
or, alternatively, some rupture in the world (an economic crisis,
a political scandal, a national trauma) leads to the sidelining of
established political parties because they are blamed for longstanding problems.125 Many voters who become cynical after too
many failed promises—and who already voted repeatedly for
moderate change only to get no change at all—will then opt for
illiberalism.126 A tsunami of an election finally tips a weakened
constitutional structure into collapse. This is how charismatic autocrats ascend to power.
But the casualty here is liberalism, even as the external appearance of democracy and constitutionalism remain in place.
120 “Neoliberal authoritarianism” describes the inability of elected leaders to escape
neoliberal economic policy, no matter what those leaders’ own political views are. Michael
A. Wilkinson, The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional
Crisis of the European Union, 14 Ger L J 527, 528, 550–51 (2013). See Ian Bruff, The Rise
of Authoritarian Neoliberalism, 26 Rethinking Marxism 113, 113–14 (2014). For the effects
of neoliberal economic policy on democratic publics, see generally Larry M. Bartels, Unequal
Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Russell Sage 2d ed 2016).
121 See Hanspeter Kriesi, The Political Consequences of the Economic Crises in
Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest, in Nancy Bermeo and Larry M.
Bartels, eds, Mass Politics in Tough Times: Opinions, Votes and Protest in the Great Recession 297, 297–98 (Oxford 2014).
122 See, for example, Matthew Taylor, The Limits of Judicial Independence: A Model
with Illustration from Venezuela under Chávez, 46 J Latin Am Stud 229, 248–56 (2014)
(explaining how the Chávez government undermined the judicial independence of the
Venezuelan high court). See also James Melton and Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial
Independence Really Matter? A Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence, 2
J L & Cts 187, 190 (2014) (concluding that judicial independence decreases when either
the appointment or removal powers of judges are in political hands).
123 See Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, Political Corruption in Europe, in José
M. Magone, ed, Routledge Handbook of European Politics 669, 679–80 (Routledge 2015).
124 While state capture by a political party is different than party capture by a particular faction within a party, the two are often found together. See, for example, Abby
Innes, The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe, 52 J Common Mkt
Stud 88, 92–94 (2012).
125 For an example from Venezuela, see Jason Seawright, Party-System Collapse: The
Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela 1–2 (Stanford 2012) (discussing the collapse of the
previously stable two-party system in advance of the Chávez election).
126 See generally Béla Greskovits, The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East
European and Latin American Transformations Compared (CEU 1998). For an update of
his argument, see Béla Greskovits, The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East
Central Europe, 6 Global Pol 28, 35–36 (Supp June 2015).
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The problem is that ordinary lawmaking by democratic majorities
requires limits set by liberalism. Process and debate must be respected to ensure that minorities are not trampled. The loyal opposition must be treated as standing inside rather than outside
the circle of constitutional protection and must retain some role
in the lawmaking process. Liberal constitutions require other
ground rules, too. Rights of speech and assembly, the independence of institutions like courts, media, and the civil sector, as well
as the guardianship of the constitution by an independent checking body like a constitutional court, must be protected, even from
democratic majorities. Against these liberal limits, the new legalistic autocrats argue that they cannot be constrained because
they speak for the people. They summon legal and popular authority as a way to justify everyday political decisions. They jettison liberalism.
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
This Essay has shown that a new generation of autocrats has
learned to govern by appealing to electoral legitimacy while using
the tools of law to consolidate power in few hands. The new autocrats can and do win elections—often repeated elections—but, after their first victory, they stay in power by weakening the opposition support structures like parties and NGOs, by monopolizing
the broadcast media to limit public debate, by harassing critics,
and by tinkering with the election rules. They rewrite constitutions to make what was once unconstitutional into something constitutional. They do not, as a first resort, call out the tanks or declare a state of emergency; they do not enter office with a phalanx
of soldiers. Instead they come to power with a phalanx of lawyers.
The new autocrats look like democrats playing hardball,127 not
like dictators playing softball.
The move from hardball democrat to legalistic autocrat is
achieved by undermining constitutionally entrenched checks on
executive power, often (as we have seen) by changing the constitution so that what was once unconstitutional is no longer. By

127 Professor Tushnet has usefully called attention to the practice of “constitutional
hardball,” by which he means “political claims and practices . . . that are without much
question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are
nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings.” He shows
how taken-for-granted understandings underpin a constitutional order until the moment
that they don’t. At that point, the constitutional order is weakened, sometimes to the point
of effective collapse. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 John Marshall L Rev 523,
523, 549–53 (2004).
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consolidating power under the guise of legality (often constitutional legality), the autocrats set the stage for snapping the trap
of democratic pretense when the tide of public opinion turns
against them. Once the public loses the chance to change its leaders when the romance wears off, autocracy is complete. But it is
too late to use constitutional appeals to fight autocracy at that
point because the constitution has become a hollow shell.
By now it should be clear that many of the changes that result in the de-liberalization of constitutional systems are highly
technical and therefore hard for the ordinary citizen to understand. How many people in the general public grasp the importance of differences in complex rules about judicial appointments, or see the implications of jurisdictional tweaks to a court’s
previous operating rules? How many people really comprehend
that changing rules of parliamentary procedure or altering the
structural composition of independent commissions or fiddling
with the arcane processes for drawing electoral district boundaries are crucial to the maintenance of liberal constitutionalism?
Most people see only that there is a constitution still proclaimed
in the name of “we the people.” They see that the same institutions they knew before are still standing—the constitutional
court, the parliament, the central bank, the election commission.
What could have gone so badly wrong when so much looks the
same?
The takeaway lessons of the twentieth century prepare people for different sorts of threats to liberalism: pervasive ideological appeals that justify the destruction of institutions, the invocation of total emergency, mass violations of human rights, and
tanks in the streets. By contrast, the new autocrats come to power
not with bullets but with laws. They attack the institutions of liberal constitutionalism with constitutional amendments. They
carefully preserve the shell of the prior liberal state—the same
institutions, the same ceremonies, an overall appearance of rights
protection—but in the meantime they hollow out its moral core.
Constitutional institutions survive in the same buildings, but
their liberal souls have been killed. How many people can really
see this until they themselves need constitutional protection and
find themselves defenseless? By then it is too late.
With the rise of autocratic legalism, we are witnessing new
political technologies designed to accomplish the goals of autocracy without its usual telltale signs. Autocrats can accomplish
this because the democratic publics in these places were trained
to look for the wrong signs of danger. As the new autocrats get
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more and more clever, deploying law to kill off liberalism, constitutionalists need to educate ourselves and democratic publics
about liberal constitutionalism.
First, those of us who work in the field of constitutional law
have to stare into the face of the new autocracy to track in detail
how it works. We need to learn to recognize the new signs of danger, which means that we need to get better at documenting the
trouble cases and learning from them.
Then, we need to educate others. Civic education needs to
teach people to recognize the new signs of danger. Under what
circumstances is it safe to trust the appointment of judges to a
political process? When is presidentialism a sign of danger? How
can the discretionary use of public power for economic intimidation be curbed? Why is the call to draft a new constitution alarming? People beyond the educated elite need to know why these
questions matter, and they need to learn how to think about answering them.
Law is too important to leave only to the lawyers. A citizenry
trained to resist the legalistic autocrats must be educated in the
tools of law themselves. Liberal and democratic constitutionalism
cannot remain an elite ideal that has no resonance in the general
public; that leaves this public ripe for autocratic legalists to sweep
them away in the last remaining exercises of democratic power
that the public may possess. In the days when dictators came to
power through military force, civil defense courses provided training for publics to resist with arms. In the days when dictators
come to power with law reform as their primary tool, civil defense
requires citizens to be empowered with law. Citizens need to be
trained as constitutionalists—to understand the point of constitutionalism, to recognize threats to self-sustaining democracy,
and to care about defending liberal values.
Liberal and democratic constitutionalism is worth defending,
but first we need to stop taking for granted that constitutions can
defend themselves.

